

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al)	A F F I D A V I T
- vs -)	of
RAKI, Sadao, et al)	TOMITA, Kenji

I, TOMITA, Kenji make oath and say as follows:

1. I, TOMITA, Kenji, upon graduating from the Kyoto Imperial University in 1921, joined the service of the Ministry of Home Affairs, where I successibely filled the posts of Provincial Police Superintendent, Chief of the Police Department and Secretary in the Home Office. In June, 1937 when the first KONOYE Cabinet was formed, I was appointed Chief of the Police Affairs Bureau in the Home Office. The following year I was appointed Governor of NAGANO Prefecture. In July, 1940 when the second KONOYE Cabinet came into existence, I was appointed Chief Secretary of the Cabinet. I also served in the third KONOYE Cabinet. On October 16, 1941 when the third KONOYE Cabinet resigned en bloc, I also resigned as Chief Secretary of the Cabinet. Then I was nominated member of the House of Peers. After I assumed the post of Chief of the Police Affairs Bureau in the Home Office, I called on Marquis KIDO from time to time. Especially during my tenure of office as Chief Secretary of the Cabinet, I served as Liaison official between the Government and the Office of Lord Keeper o

the Privy Seal, so that I very frequently called on Marquis KIDO, then Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. As Chief Secretary of the Cabinet I, of course, learned the opinions of the various Cabinet members by reason of my being present at the Cabinet meetings. I also spoke with various Cabinet members and members of the Government outside of Cabinet meetings. It was part of my duties to be informed of events and opinions of various officials and to carry out instructions given me by the Prime Minister.

2. During my tenure of office as Chief Secretary of the third KONOYE Cabinet, I frequently talked with Admiral OIKAWA, Navy Minister and Admiral OKA, Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau in the Navy Ministry, as the result of which I was full aware that the Navy was anxious for the continuation of diplomatic negotiation with America so as to avoid war by all means.

3. On October 11, 1941 I visited Admiral OKA, Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau at his official residence in the evening and had a short talk with him. I then called on Admiral OIKAWA, about post 10:p.m. Navy Minister at his official residence. It is very fresh in my memory that Admiral OIKAWA told me that evening.

"At this juncture. I should like to avoid war with America. I am anxious for the continuation of negotiations to the last. The lower part of the Navy will absolutely not get out of hand unlike the Army even if we do not go to war with America. True to its tradition, the lower part of the Navy will certainly abide by a decision reached by the upper part. There is no occasion for

anxiety about point. But the Navy due to its position as one of the fighting services can not openly express its views opposed to war."

From previous talks that I had with Navy officials, I knew the opinion expressed by Admiral OIKAWA was in accordance with the Navy policy. I also knew from my talks with him that Prime Minister KONOYE was extremely anxious to conclude negotiations with America in a peaceful manner so I told Admiral OIKAWA that it would be best if he supported Prime Minister KONOYE at the Ogikubo Conference to be held the next day so that the Prime Minister could continue negotiations with America by restraining the Army.

4. In this connection, the following morning, that is, October 12, Admiral OKA, Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau, when I was speaking to him on the telephone said.

"At today's OGIKUBO Conference, the Navy will state that it be entirely left to the Prime Minister whether we shall be at peace or go to war with America. The Navy could not make any statement, calculated to decide whether we shall wage war or not. I think that whether to go to war or not is the question, to be solved by the Prime Minister. Therefore, the Prime Minister has only to state clearly that he will avoid war."

5. On several occasions prior to the resignation of the KONOYE Cabinet, Admiral OIKAWA told me that it was his opinion that the KONOYE Cabinet should not resign as it should continue its efforts in the negotiations with America and he asked me to do what I could to try and persuade Prime Minister KONOYE against resigning

and he asked me to bespeak my effort to that effect.

6. On October 12, 1941, Prime Minister KONOYE invited General TOJO, War Minister; Admiral OIKAWA, Navy Minister; Admiral TOYODA, Foreign Minister and General SUZUKI, President of the Planning Board to his private residence at Ogikubo to discuss the question whether the negotiation with America should be continued or not. Prior to the conference I rendered Prime Minister KONOYE a report of my conversations with OKA and OIKAWA. I was present at Prince KONOYE's private residence at the time of the above mentioned conference but I was not actually in the room at the time the discussion was had. When the Conference was finished Prime Minister KONOYE handed me a memorandum which he said had been prepared by SUZUKI of what transpired at the meeting. Later that evening I saw KIDO and transmitted to him the contents of SUZUKI's memorandum, which appears in his Diary entry of October 12, 1941.

7. On the afternoon of October 14, 1941, General MUTO, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau in the War Ministry called on me and told me to the following effect.

"If the Navy really does not want war, the Army must also reconsider itself. As it is, however, the Navy does not seem to make any opposition to the Army and instead proposes to leave everything to the Prime Minister. It would be impossible to control Army circles with the Prime Minister's mere adjudication; but if the Navy formally communicates to the Army that it does not want war now, the Army will be able to control its members."

8. When I told Admiral OKA, Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau, about the proposal of General MUTO, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, he said:

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"It is impossible for the Navy in view of its position to formally state that it does not want war. The Navy could not formally do anything more than to abide by the Prime Minister's decision."

9. On the eve of the third KONOYE Cabinet's resignation, I suggested to Admiral OKA, Chief of the Naval Bureau in the Navy Ministry:

"How about making Navy Minister OIKAWA form a succeeding Cabinet as Prime Minister?"

In reply, Admiral OKA stated;

"Admiral OIKAWA is no statesman, so it will be impossible for him to preside over a Cabinet as Prime Minister."

10. About October 19, 1941, I resigned as Chief Secretary of the third KONOYE Cabinet. The following morning I called on Marquis KIDO, then Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal at his office in the Imperial palace compounds to inform him of my resignation. On that occasion, we had a general discussion about the circumstances leading up to the resignation of the third KONOYE Cabinet. I recall that Marquis KIDO told me to the following effect:

"I wish that Prince KONOYE had held out a little more. His Majesty too revealed such an opinion. I thought that he would not yet resign, so I was astonished to hear on the afternoon of October 16 that he had collected the resignations of his Cabinet colleagues. If things came to such a pass, I thought that it could not be helped. On October 16, War Minister TOJO came to me. Judging by his remarks, I understood that he would not be necessarily opposed to the diplomatic negotiations with America if His Majesty granted a message to him to that effect. I wish that Prince KONOYE had acted more cautiously."

11. From late in June, 1945 to about the close of the war, Prince KONOYE frequently told me to the following effect:

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"Various visitors to Marquis KIDO made various criticisms of his, but I do not necessarily subscribe to their criticisms." When the war terminated Prince KONOYE told me, "Such was the strenuous efforts of Marquis KIDO for peace that the Emperor owed his strong action in restoring peace entirely to the Marquis. Credit goes to Marquis. Credit goes to Marquis KIDO for the most substantial services rendered for terminating the war and restoring peace."

On this 4 day of Feb., 1947

At I.M.T.F.E.

DEPONENT TOMITA, Kenji (seal)

I, HAZUMI, Shigetaka hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At same place

Witness: (signed) HOZUMI, Shigetaka
(seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

TOMITA, Kenji (seal)

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Exh, NO

極東國際軍事裁判所

亞米利加合衆國其他

對

荒木貞夫其他

宣誓供述書

供述者 富田健治

自分機外國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ヅ別紙ノ通り宣誓ヲ爲シタル上
次ノ如ク供述致シマス

余、富田健治ハ官誓ノ上左ノ通り陳述ス。

一、余、富田健治ハ大正十年京大卒、後内務省ニ入リ地方官、警察部長、内務事務官ヲ歴任シ、昭和十二年六月第一次近衛内閣ノ警保局長トナリ十三年末長野縣知事拜命、昭和十五年七月第二次近衛内閣ノ成立ニ伴ヒ内閣書記官長ニ任ゼラレ、第三次近衛内閣ニモ兼任シ、昭和十六年十月十六日第三次近衛内閣總辭職ト共ニ辭任、貴族院議員ニ任ゼラレタルモノナルトコロ、警保局長以來木戸侯ヲ時々訪問、殊ニ書記官長當時ハ以府ト内府トノ連絡ニ付極メテ頻繁ニ接觸シタルモノデアアル。

内閣書記官長トシテ余ハ閣議ノ席ニアリシ故閣員ノ意見ハ之ヲ知悉シテ一タ。又余ハ閣議ニ於テ或ハ又閣議以外ニ於テ閣員ト談合シタ。斯ク各方面ノ事脈及意見ヲ常ニ知り又首相ノ指示ニ基イテ之ヲ貫徹スルノハ余ノ任務ノ一部デアツタ。

二、余ハ第三次近衛内閣書記官長在職中、及川海相及同軍務局長ト頻繁ニ談合シ、海軍ガ日米外交々々シラド迄モ繼續シ、戦争ハ廻延モ避ケタイ爲同デアアルコトヲ充分知ツテ居タ。

三、一九四一年（昭和十六年）十月十一日余ハ又同軍務局長ヲ其官舎ニ勸ヒ少時會議セリ。次イデ十時過頃及川海相ヲ官邸ニ訪問シタルデアアルガ其際海相ガ語ラレタルコトハ余ノ記憶ニ實ニ明確ニ残ツテ居ル。「此際

日米戦争ハ避ケタイノデアツテ自分ハ醜態モ父の福頼ヲ希望スル。又陸軍ト異ツテ海軍ノ下層部ガ戦争シナケレバ収マラヌ等ト云フコトハ絶對ニナイ。海軍ハ情願トシテ上ガ定メタコトハ下ハ必ズ服従スルノデアアル。ソノ點ハ全然心配ハ要ラヌ。但シ海軍トシテハ早ノ立場上、此ノ戦争反對ノ意見ヲ公式ニ明言スルコトハ出来ナイノデアアル。云々ト述ベタ。之ヨリ先余ハ海軍關係ノ人々トノ話ニ依リ及川大將ノ言ハ海軍ノ方針デアルコトヲ知悉シテ居タ。又余ハ近衛首相ガ對米平和解決ヲ非常ニ急シテ居ラレタコトヲ首相トノ會話ヨリ知ツテ居リタルガ故ニ余ハ及川大將ニ翌日ノ款渾會議デ強力ニ近衛公ヲ支援シ陸軍ヲ抑ヘテ日本交渉ヲ繼續シ得ル機勢力セラレタイ旨ヲ告ゲタ。

四、之ニ對シ翌十二日朝岡局長ト電話ニテ談合中局長ヨリ「今日ノ款渾會議ノ席上ニ於テハ、和戰ノ決定ハ總理一仕ト言フ發言ヲスルツモリデア。爾。軍トシテハ戦争スベキヤ否ヲ決定スル發言ハ出来ナイ。戦争スルヤ否ヲハ總理ガ決メルベキ問題デアルト思フ。ソコデ總理サヘハツキリ戦争ヲ避ケルト言ツテ眞ヘバヨイノデアアル。」ト言ツテ來タノデアアル。

五、近衛内閣總理職ニ先立ち岡軍務局長ハ當時屢々余ニ對シ「日本交渉ハ續ノ爲ニハ近衛内閣ハ絶對ニ辭職シテハナラナイ。近衛公ヲ辭メサセナイ様ニ盡力シテクレ。」ト云ツタ。

六、一九四一年十月十二日近衛總理ハ秋津ノ私邸ニ東條陸相、及川海相、
豐田外相、鈴木企畫院總裁ヲ招集シテ、日米交渉ノ見通ニ付會議ヲ
開イタ。此ノ會議ニ先立チテ余ハ同、及川兩氏トノ會談ニツイテノ報告
ヲ近衛首相ニ提出シテアツタ。

余ハ右會議ノ行ハレタルトキ近衛公私邸ニ居タガ、會議進行中ハ其ノ室
内ニハ居ナカツタ。會議終了後近衛首相ハ鈴木氏ニ依ル談事録覽ヲ余
ニ手交シタ。同夜遅ク余ハ木戸侯ニ會ヒ鈴木氏ノ覽書ノ内容ヲ告ゲタガ
ソレガ木戸日記一九四一年十月十二日ノ内容デアル。

七、一九四一年十月十四日午後武蔵國軍省軍務局長ハ余ノ許ニ來リ、「海
軍ガ本當ニ戰爭ヲ欲シナイナラバ、陸軍モ再考セネバナラナイ。然ルニ
海軍ハ陸軍ニ向ツテ表面ハ反對セズ總理一任ト云フコトヲ云ツテ居ル。
總理ノ裁斷ト云フ丈デハ陸軍部内ヲ押ヘルコトハ出來ヌガ、海軍ガ此際
戰爭ヲ欲セズト云フコトヲ公式ニ陸軍ニ言ツテ來ルナラバ陸軍トシテモ
部内ヲ押ヘルコトガ出來ル。云々」ト申入レテ來タ。

八、余ハ右ノ申入レヲ同軍務局長ニ話シタ處、「海軍トシテハ戰爭ヲ欲セ
ズト云フコトヲ公式ニ云フコトハ軍ノ立脚カラシテ出來ナイコトデア
ル海軍トシテハ公式ニハ總理ノ裁斷ニ一任ト云フコト以上ニハ出來
レナイト答ヘタ。

九、第三次近衛内閣總辭職前、余ハ同早務局長ニ對シ「及川海相ヲ總理ニシタラ如何」ト詰シタルコトアリ。之ニ對シ同局長ハ「及川大將ハ以治家デハナイカラ總理ハツトマラヌ」ト答ヘタ。

十、一九四一年十月十九日頃余ハ第三次近衛内閣書記官長ヲ辭職シ其ノ後移ノ爲同廿日朝木戸内府ヲ宮中内大臣室ニ訪問シ、内閣總辭職前後ノコトニ付山々語ヲ交シタ。其際木戸内府ハ「近衛君ハ今少シ頑張ツテクレタラミカツタ。陛下モ左様ナ御言葉ヲ洩ラサレタ。自分ハマダマダハメルコトハナイト思ツテ居タノニ十六日午後ニナツテ閣僚ノ辭表ヲトリツツアルト聞イテビツクリシタ。又其處迄行ツテ居ルナラ仕方ガナイト思ツタ。十六日ニ東條陸相ガ自分ノ所ヘヤツテ來タガ、陛下ノ御言葉ガアレバ陸相モ必ズシモ外交交渉ニ反對スルモノトハ思ハレナカツタ。近衛君ハ返ス返スモ今少シ自重シテ欲シカツタ。云々」ト詰ラレタ。

十一、昭和二十年六月下旬以來終戰前後ニ至ル間ニ於テ近衛公ハ屢々余ニ次ノ如キ談ヲ繰返サレタ。
「木戸侯ニ對シ種々ノ訪問者ガ仇讎ノ聲ヲ放ツケレドモ、自分ハ必シモ之等ノ批難ニ實成シナイ」終戰當時近衛公ハ余ニ同ヒ次ノ如キ詰ヲナアレタ「終戰ニ對スル不戸侯ノ努力ハ非常ナモノデアッテ陛下ノアノ強イ終戰ヘノ御行動モ一ニ不戸侯ノ力ニ依ルモノデアアル。終戰ノ切實ノ第一人者ハ何ト云ツテモ不戸侯ダト思フ。云々」

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昭和二十二年（一九四七年）二月四日

於 極東國際軍事裁判所

供 述 者 富 田 健 治

右ハ當立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ者名捺印シタルコトヲ證明

シマス

同 日 於 同 所

立會人 總 領 重 慶

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良心ニ從ヒ眞實ヲ述ベ何事ヲモ祇秘セズ又何事ヲモ附加セザルコト

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